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and again, either directly or indirectly, throughout the volume. The first of these is that Pitt was *not* always and ever "his own master"—with a free hand to direct British policy, and a complete control of his cabinet. Mr. Rose, when treating of foreign policy up to 1797, is very careful, for example, to state that "Pitt and Grenville", or "Grenville and Pitt" reached a determination, and took such and such a step. Pitt is shown indeed as the recognized leader, but not as the dominating master of English policy, whether at home or abroad. Secondly, it is acknowledged that Pitt was not fitted by previous experience to deal successfully with the intriguing diplomacy of the Continental courts, was too trustful of foreign powers in alliance with England, and was frequently deceived. But here, as also in regard to military affairs, Mr. Rose states rightly that Pitt should not be judged incapable because of occasional failures, but rather as a man of superior ability, since, cast unexpectedly into a vortex of war and diplomacy, for which he had no natural gifts, he rose in the end above his limitations, and evolved certain great principles of action that brought England safely through the crisis. And in the third place, with repeated emphasis, the author regrets Pitt's treatment of the movement in England for political reform. Himself earlier an advocate of such reform, he seems to have lost heart in the cause and to have turned in the end to a severe repression of it. The so-called revolutionary movement in England, the author does not consider to have been ever seriously dangerous. Pitt himself was not troubled by its first manifestations, and not until the rupture with France did he begin those acts of repression that have dimmed his fame. The Whig accusation that Pitt secretly stirred revolt, that he might gain parliamentary support by crushing it, Mr. Rose denies, but Pitt's cruelty in repression, the author does not think justified. "So far as I have found, not one life was taken by the people in the course of this agitation. . . . The hero of the year 1794 is not William Pitt, but the British nation. . . . In truth, Pitt had not the gift without which the highest abilities and the most strenuous endeavours will at novel crises be at fault—a sympathetic insight into the needs and aspirations of the people. His analytical powers enabled him to detect the follies of the royalist crusaders; but he lacked those higher powers of synthesis which alone could discern the nascent strength of Democracy." Mr. Rose is in the main, however, eulogistic of Pitt, but the illustrations just given indicate that in this life of his hero he has preserved an unbiased mind. The result is a work superior as an historical study to any that has appeared in English on the career of the younger Pitt.

EPHRAIM D. ADAMS.

*Pitt and Napoleon: Essays and Letters.* By J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D., Reader in Modern European History, University of Cambridge. (London: G. Bell and Sons; New York: The Macmillan Company. 1912. Pp. vii, 343.)

DR. ROSE here presents eleven essays and ten selections from correspondence. The True Significance of Trafalgar, and General Marbot and his Memoirs are reprints. Of the remaining essays, six treat of Pitt and three of Napoleon, while all of the correspondence relates to Pitt. In substance the author offers in this volume, in greater detail than seemed suitable to his earlier volumes, an account of certain episodes or conditions in the careers of the two great antagonists. In the essay entitled "Was Pitt responsible for the Quiberon Disaster?" Mr. Rose is in reality concerned to answer the accusation later made by Fox, Sheridan, and the *Émigrés*, that Pitt was guilty of perfidy in deliberately organizing an expedition secretly designed to get rid of the *Émigrés* themselves, and relieve England of the burden of their presence. This accusation no credible historian has made, and the author's defense was not needed. As to responsibility in the sense of lack of foresight, and confusion of ideas and instructions, Mr. Rose emphasizes the incapacity of Puisaye and Hervilly, the mutual suspicions of royalist leaders, and the antagonism and lack of co-operation between peasant and noble. The general effect of the study is to place the blame for disaster upon the *Émigrés* themselves, where indeed it in large part belongs, but in reaching this conclusion Mr. Rose apparently loses sight of the historical accusation still remaining, that English governmental mismanagement (not perfidy) was a contributing element, and that for this Pitt *was* responsible. In another essay, "Did Napoleon intend to invade England?" Mr. Rose affirms that on three distinct occasions Napoleon really planned such invasion, but was each time distracted by unexpected conditions. The proof here offered is very slight, documents are lacking, and the author's verdict rests rather on his conception of Napoleon's character—always optimistic, over-bold, and confident in his superior military genius. The essay on Napoleon's Conception of the Battle of Waterloo also dwells upon this element in Napoleon's character, but the matter is much better handled than in the previous essay. Mr. Rose here brings together the utterances of Napoleon during the progress of the battle, and his later statements, to show that he neither at the time nor later, clearly realized the military situation, and was almost to the last disdainful of his opponents. Mr. Rose writes (pp. 196-197), "Singularly enough, Napoleon never understood why he was beaten. . . . The most curious feature of the whole question is the inability of Napoleon to understand that he himself was responsible for losing the campaign. As has now appeared, he underrated the fighting power of the allied armies and the abilities of their commanders. . . . There is little or no sign of hesitation on which M. Houssaye has laid stress. On the contrary, every move up to about 4:30 betokened absolute confidence in the result." The correspondence forming part II. of the present volume is not especially interesting or illuminating since it consists for the most part in letters, as in the fifteen from Grenville to Pitt, which have little or no meaning unless read in

connection with those which drew them out. Nevertheless, as in the case just cited, the letters here published fill out gaps in correspondence previously printed elsewhere, and are therefore of value to the student of the period. Taken all in all however the volume is not up to the standard of Mr. Rose's previous work. It unfortunately leaves the impression of mere book-making—of using material for which no suitable place was found either in his earlier work on Napoleon, or in his more recent volumes on Pitt.

EPHRAIM D. ADAMS.

*Mémoires et Documents inédits sur la Révolution Belge et la Campagne de Dix-Jours* (1830–1831). Recueillis et annotés par le Baron CAMILLE BUFFIN, Avocat. In two volumes. (Brussels: Kiessling et Cie. 1912. Pp. 650.)

THESE two volumes, issued under the auspices of the Royal Historical Commission of Belgium, contain about twelve hundred pages of hitherto unpublished material upon the Belgian Revolution of 1830 and upon the brief campaign of 1831 which followed upon the success of that movement and in which King William I. tried to win back his southern provinces, only to be checked by France and by diplomacy. These documents are of unequal value and of fragmentary character. They give no complete account of the revolution but light up many points of detail in the history of the times. Most of them are from the pens of military men and have to do mainly with military or semi-military events or plans. Political movements and diplomatic measures occupy a less prominent place; indeed the latter hardly appear at all. Considerable parts of the military documents are of a formal, statistical nature, of interest to the professional military historian but of slight value to the political historian. The latter will however be abundantly rewarded for a careful examination of these volumes. He will find in them valuable evidence concerning the spontaneous and powerful insurgence of national feeling, and illustrating the rapid spread of the spirit of revolt from Brussels to other towns, large and small. He will perceive the fundamental unwisdom of the Congress of Vienna in thinking that states can be artificially created and can endure, in spite of history, race, and sentiment, an error for which the practical men of Vienna had for years been reproaching the French revolutionists and Napoleon. The political historian will not get from these documents any light on the work of the Belgian revolutionists in the construction of new national institutions, in the elaboration of a new fundamental law, in the inauguration of a new monarchy in Europe. Nor will he gain any new insight into the causes of the revolution, for the narratives do not go back to causes but begin with the Brussels riots of August, 1830.

The first of the two volumes contains unpublished memoirs of three men who participated very actively and in important ways in the events